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provide can be questioned for insurance-based health systems. The
results of genetic tests oftentimes may not lead to well-deﬁned clinical
interventions; however, Lynch syndrome, a genetic mutation for which
carriers are at an increased risk for colorectal cancer, can be identiﬁed
through genetic testing, and meaningful health interventions are avail-
able via increased colonoscopic surveillance. Valuations of test informa-
tion for such conditions ought to account for the full impact of
interventions and contingent outcomes. Objectives: To conduct a
discrete-choice experiment to elicit individuals’ preferences for genetic
test information. Methods: A Web-enabled discrete-choice experiment
survey was administered to a representative sample of US residents aged
50 years and older. In addition to specifying expenditures on colonos-
copies, respondents were asked to make a series of nine selections
between two hypothetical genetic tests or a no-test option under the
premise that a relative had Lynch syndrome. The hypothetical geneticee front matter & 2014 Published by Elsevier Inc.
(ISPOR).
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ndence to: Vikram Kilambi, 200 Park Ofﬁces Drive,tests were deﬁned by the probability of developing colorectal cancer, the
probability of a false-negative test result, privacy of the result, and out-of-
pocket cost. A model speciﬁcation identifying necessary interactions was
derived from assumptions of risk behavior and the decision context and
was estimated using random-parameters logit. Results: A total of 650
respondents were contacted, and 385 completed the survey. Themonetary
equivalent of test information was approximately $1800. Expenditures on
colonoscopies to reduce mortality risks affected valuations. Respondents
with lower income or who reported being employed signiﬁcantly valued
genetic tests more. Conclusion: Genetic testing may confer beneﬁts
through the impact of subsequent interventions on private individuals.
Keywords: colorectal cancer, discrete choice experiment, genetic
testing, Lynch syndrome.
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Recent advances in molecular genetic testing technology provide
individuals with opportunities to acquire information about
predispositions to cancers and other diseases. Despite its prom-
ise, the merit of such information is not unequivocal, especially
when well-deﬁned clinical responses to test results are lacking
[1,2]. Ideally, test results aid health care professionals and
individuals to predict the risk of developing genetic conditions
and to begin effective health interventions earlier.
Although the information may be valuable in itself [3], it is
worthwhile for economic evaluations to account for the effects of
health interventions on individuals contingent on the ﬁnal test
result. Lynch syndrome, or hereditary nonpolyposis colorectal
cancer (CRC), provides a demonstrative example. The condition is
caused by a genetic mutation characterized by a high risk of
developing CRC. Carriers of the mutation may have up to 80%
probability of contracting CRC, usually before the age of 50 years.
Clinical studies indicate that increased colonoscopic surveillance
yields signiﬁcant reductions in mortality risk [4]. Clinical guidelines
recommend frequent colonoscopies, especially in families in whichthe mutation has been previously observed, to detect CRC earlier
[5–9]. The advent of genetic testing makes it possible to identify
whether a particular individual in a family with Lynch history has
the mutation. The information may not only lead to earlier
detection and treatment of CRC but also spare noncarriers from
needlessly undergoing additional colonoscopies. Although the
incidence of the mutation in the general population is relatively
low (0.10%) [4], several members of the affected families can avoid
prolonged surveillance and the discomfort and expense associated
with this erroneous path.
The role of genetic testing is examined at both the policy and
individual levels. Policy and reimbursement authorities are con-
cerned with costs relative to the quantiﬁable clinical beneﬁts of
genetic screening for the general population and speciﬁc sub-
populations, as well as the overall effect of screening on health
care expenditures. A review of several economic evaluations of
genetic testing by Rogowski [10] and Rogowski et al. [11] reveals
skepticism for whether publicly funded screening poses an
acceptable burden on health care budgets and even for whether
the costs of most screening programs exceed the potential
savings from early prevention.on behalf of International Society for Pharmacoeconomics and
PO Box 12194, Research Triangle Park, NC 27709-2194, USA.
Table 1 – Attributes and levels used in discrete-
choice experiment.
Attributes Levels
Chance that you will get
colorectal cancer*
10 out of 100 (10%)
25 out of 100 (25%)
50 out of 100 (50%)
Chance of a false-negative test
result (the test result says
people do not have the gene
when people actually do
have it)
0 out of 10 times (0%)
1 out of 10 times (10%)
2 out of 10 times (20%)
In addition to you, who else sees
the test results
Your primary care doctor
Your genetics health
professionals
Your life insurance and
health insurance
companies
Personal cost to you not covered
by insurance
$250
$500
$1000 or $1500†
* Risk of colorectal cancer, given the presence of the genetic
mutation.
† Half the participants saw $1000, and half the participants
saw $1500.
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different. For conditions such as Lynch syndrome, for which
meaningful interventions are possible, the potential clinical
beneﬁts of genetic tests for individuals are apparent but costs
depend on a number of factors such as the expenses of the tests
and colonoscopies and the discomfort and inconvenience of
undergoing procedures. In the United States, costs of genetic
tests are paid either by insurance or by the patient (out of
pocket). The test result itself may raise privacy concerns or
negative psychological responses, such as a fear of discrimina-
tion from positive test results or complacency from negative test
results [12,13]. False positives and false negatives may further
aggravate individuals. Foster et al. [14] propose a generic,
composite measure of the “personal” utility of genomic infor-
mation that includes all informational effects on individual
patient behavior in addition to all other costs and beneﬁts. A
complete account, although not considered herein, would even
include changes in lifestyle, human capital, and reproductive
decisions [15].
Direct elicitation of individual willingness to pay for a genetic
test is one approach to assessing the contribution of personal
utility to beneﬁts and costs associated with genetic testing.
Neumann et al. [16] recently elicited willingness to pay for test
results from a general population sample in the United States via
a contingent-valuation survey. Depending on both the possible
disease and the accuracy of the testing procedure, the estimated
values for test information varied from $100 to $300. Given that
prices for current genetic tests fall outside this range, it is difﬁcult
to claim that individuals would indeed pay for a test themselves
[17]. Grosse et al. [18] are skeptical of such cost-beneﬁt analyses
in general because studies commonly include only morbidity and
mortality outcomes, neglecting other informational effects. The
authors recommended more indirect approaches, such as
discrete-choice experiments (DCEs) or choice-format conjoint
analysis [18]. These approaches may accommodate conceptually
based measures of individual responses to new genomic infor-
mation [19,20]. DCEs are not the only reasonable method for
understanding individuals’ decisions to mitigate mortality risk
via genetic tests—for example, stochastic decision trees have
been used for Lynch syndrome in addition to contingent-
valuation methods for cancer risks [16,21]. In addition to accom-
modating valuations of risk and information, DCEs can simulta-
neously incorporate valuations of other test features (e.g., the
privacy of test results).
Thus, the objective of this study was to motivate DCEs as a
viable method for measuring the “personal utility” of genomic
information, speciﬁcally for treatable conditions with mean-
ingful interventions. We intend to show that DCEs can accom-
modate the elicitation of preferences for the features of genetic
tests and can control for the potential recourse actions of
individuals in response to genetic test results. Exploiting the
ﬂexibility of DCEs, however, requires careful consideration of
the model speciﬁcation, particularly when multiple health
interventions are available in response to results from genetic
testing. For Lynch syndrome, individuals’ evaluations of genetic
test information depend on the perceived likelihood of having
the mutation, the accuracy and features of the test, and the cost
and efﬁcacy of colonoscopic surveillance. Ignoring the hetero-
geneity of the perceived value of test results on the basis of an
individual’s expected behavioral response to genetic informa-
tion may bias the evaluation. We implement a DCE study for a
representative US sample and derive an empirical choice model
speciﬁcation that incorporates the evaluations of subsequent
interventions for Lynch syndrome; calculate individuals’ evalu-
ations of the test information; and determine speciﬁc groups of
individuals that may have stronger preferences for genetic
testing.Methods
DCE Survey
We used a DCE to elicit individuals’ stated preferences for
genetic testing for elevated CRC risks. Using clinical-expert recom-
mendations and seven focus groups (42 respondents total), we
identiﬁed salient features for genetic testing. Each focus group
featured an open-ended discussion of genetic testing and a struc-
tured discussion of speciﬁc factors that inﬂuenced the decision to
test. The transcripts of the interviews were coded and analyzed by
three experienced qualitative researchers using a content analysis
approach [22]. We identiﬁed four genetic testing features to describe
genetic testing alternatives for Lynch syndrome (Table 1): the
probability of developing CRC because of a genetic mutation, the
likelihood of a false-negative test result, who else observes the test
result, and the personal cost not covered by insurance [23].
After the focus groups, 10 face-to-face general population
interviews were conducted to test a draft survey and make
necessary revisions. The choice-format conjoint survey instru-
ment was developed and tested using best-practice methods [24].
Survey development included careful face-to-face pretesting of
the instrument to ensure that attribute deﬁnitions and choice
tasks were explained in simple, understandable language. A
simple risk tutorial and graphical representation of probabilities
ensured sufﬁcient comprehension of risk trade-offs [25]. False
positives were also initially included, but interviewees in the
face-to-face interviews often confused false positives with false
negatives when presented together in the same choice question.
Moreover, false positives are more likely to invite follow-up
procedures and monitoring that can correct test errors and
previous studies have found that the likelihood of a false
negative is more important to patients [18]. Therefore, our
application accounted for potential false-negative genetic test
results only. For autosomal-dominant disorders such as Lynch
syndrome, the probability of having the mutation may be
inferred by the presence of the mutation in an individual’s
relative. The levels of the risk attribute were designed with this
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ing CRC would roughly correspond to the individual’s parent or
sibling having the mutation. Also, the presence of an outside
observer was included in the study because focus groups and
other studies indicated that respondents had signiﬁcant concerns
about the disclosure of genetic test results and discrimination
based on genetic proﬁles [26–28]. The survey also collected
standard demographic information (e.g., age, sex, race, marital
status, and education), as well as a number of items about the
respondents’ experiences with genetic testing and cancer.
In each choice question, respondents, with the assumption
that a relative had a mutation, were given a probability of
developing CRC and asked to choose between two hypothetical
genetic blood test proﬁles (“test A” or “test B”) and a “no-test”
option in which each proﬁle was deﬁned by varying levels of the
remaining three test attributes. To create test proﬁles for the
choice questions, we used the MktEx and ChoiceEff algorithms in
SAS (Cary, NC) to construct a D-efﬁcient fractional-factorial
experimental design with 36 choice pairs [29–34]. The ﬁnal
experimental design consisted of four survey versions, each
containing nine choice questions. Each respondent was ran-
domly assigned to one of the four versions. The survey was
approved by Research Triangle Institute’s Ofﬁce of Research
Protection and Ethics. All respondents provided online informed
consent to participate in the study.
To link respondents’ preferences for genetic tests to their
demand for colonoscopies, respondents also indicated their
expenditures on colonoscopies in their lifetime if they had Lynch
syndrome. The contingent-valuation “payment-card” list of
options ranged from 2 to 20 colonoscopies at a given cost; the
mortality risk reduction for each screening level was also pre-
sented. Six lists were generated with combinations of price per
colonoscopy ($250, $500, or $1000) and a 1% or 1.5% mortality risk
reduction per colonoscopy from a baseline risk of 35%.
Sample
Screening guidelines recommend colonoscopy screening for
those older than 50 years [4]. All participating respondents
therefore were 50 years or older and a US resident. The empirical
model required information about changes in the quantity of
colonoscopies purchased in response to a positive genetic test
result. Surveying respondents who already were following a
schedule of colonoscopies eliminated some of the uncertainty
around respondents’ assessment of these changes. Respondents
also were likely to be familiar with the direct and indirect costs of
colonoscopies. GFK/Knowledge Networks, a survey-research
company, administered the Web-enabled survey to members of
its online consumer panel in April 2010. The panel is a repre-
sentative, probability-based sample of the US population [35–37].
Empirical Model
Van Houtven et al. [38] proposed a unique expected-utility frame-
work for valuing treatment-related risks for cancer using DCEs. We
adapted the framework for valuing informational effects of genetic
test results. For convenience, we assumed that individuals are risk
neutral and that their marginal utility of income is constant.
An individual’s decision is based on evaluating three con-
tingent outcomes: opting-out of the test and facing uncertainty,
electing a test and receiving a positive result, or electing a test
and receiving a negative test result. When reliable genetic test
information is rejected, individuals still confront a risk of devel-
oping CRC and invest in reducing mortality risk via colonos-
copies. We denote EUNoTest as the baseline expected utility when
the individuals opt-out (the expectation is taken over the risk of
mortality from having the mutation).Reliable test information resolves uncertainty about mutation
status. Individuals then modify their behavior on the basis of the
test result. If the genetic test result is accurate and positive,
individuals can increase expenditures on colonoscopies, Q0 Z
Q Z 0, to reduce mortality risks. Q0 represents the increased
expenditure on colonoscopies when the individual decides to
opt-out with baseline expenditure Q. Furthermore, if the test
result is accurate and negative, individuals can reduce their
expenditures. Y describes the individual’s annualized value of
life and full income (i.e., money income plus imputed value of
leisure time). We use annual income as a conservative, lower
bound proxy for Y [39]. These two cases are described by
Equations 1 and 2, respectively.
VþStatus¼S Q 'ð Þ YQ 'ð Þ ð1Þ
VStatus¼S Q0ð Þ Yð Þ ð2Þ
where S denotes the perceived probability of the single-period
survival as an increasing, differentiable function of Q. Q0 repre-
sents expenditures when the individual does not have the
mutation. The equations can be rescaled into utilities by multi-
plying by βp, the constant marginal utility of income.
UþStatus¼βp S Q'ð Þ YQ'ð Þ½  ð3Þ
UStatus¼βp S Q0ð Þ Yð Þ
  ð4Þ
Apart from the produced test result, a genetic test may have
other features that contribute to utility. Such features include the
monetary costs of testing and whether other external parties (i.e.,
health care professionals, insurance companies) observe the test
result. These ancillary features are represented in Equation 5, in
which p represents the price of the test and X describes other
salient testing features. Also, β denotes a vector of utility or
preference weights for all other features.
UFeatures¼βppþ βX ð5Þ
Equation 6 states that if PL is the probability of developing CRC on
the basis of a relative’s knownmutation, then the individual selects a
genetic test if the expected utility of remaining ignorant of the test
result minus the utility of other test features is less than the expected
utility of the test result. Using δNoTest and δTest as indicators for no-test
or testing alternative, respectively, Equation 7 rewrites Equation 6.
Choose Test3UFeaturesþpL UþStatusþ 1pL
 
UStatus4EUNoTest ð6Þ
UChoice¼EUNoTestδNoTestþ pLUþStatusþ 1pL
 
UStatusþUFeatures
 
δTest
ð7Þ
In reality, no test is perfectly accurate. False-negative results
for life-threatening conditions are potentially serious because they
discourage interventions that can lower mortality risks. We denote
the individual’s utility in such an event as UErr. Inaccuracy
diminishes the value of the test. Assuming no retesting and that
the probabilities of testing errors are known, the utility of inaccu-
rate tests is as follows (PF is the probability of a false negative):
UChoice¼EUNoTestδNoTestþ ð1pFÞ½pLUþStatusþ 1pL
 
UStatus
 
þpFUErrþUFeaturesδTest ð8Þ
Equation 8 serves as the basis for the empirical model and
identiﬁes several necessary interactions to include in the model.
The parameters of interest are the utilities. We replace the
utilities with the estimated parameters βi. A set
of demographic characteristics, Z, is interacted with the no-test
alternative to identify subgroups that may have strong prefer-
ences for tests. Equation 9 presents the model speciﬁcation.
UChoice¼½β0þβ1ZδNoTestþ½ð1pFÞ½pLðYQ'Þβ2þ 1pL
 
β3
þpFβ4þβppþβXδTest ð9Þ
Table 2 – Respondent characteristics.
Characteristic N = 385
(%)*
Age (mean years and range) 63 (50, 96)†
Gender Male 191 (50)
Female 194 (50)
Children Yes 312 (81)
No 72 (19)
Missing 1
Race/ethnicity White, non-Hispanic 298 (77)
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equations and was ﬁt with error-components, random-parameters
logit (mixed logit with error components) using NLOGIT 4.0 [40–43].
Error components allow for correlations of utilities among groups of
alternatives (i.e., the two test alternatives and the nontest alterna-
tive) [40]. To enable estimation, the levels of the privacy attribute
were effects coded and β4 was set to zero. Q0 was obtained from
respondents’ answers to the contingent-valuation “payment card”
question. Unobserved taste heterogeneity was assumed to follow a
normal distribution, and the model was estimated using 1000
Halton draws.Black, non-Hispanic 39 (10)
Hispanic 20 (5)
Other, non-Hispanic 15 (4)
Two or more races,
non-Hispanic
13 (3)
Educational
attainment
Less than high school 45 (12)
High school 131 (34)
Some college 112 (29)
Bachelor’s degree or
higher
97 (25)
Marital status Married 236 (61)
Widowed 41 (11)
Divorced 52 (14)
Separated 8 (2)
Never married 34 (9)
Living with partner 14 (4)
Household income
level
Less than $25,000 86 (22)
$25,000 to $49,999 110 (29)
$50,000 to $74,999 84 (22)
$75,000 to $99,999 49 (13)
$100,000 or more 56 (15)
Employment status Working – as a paid
employee
114 (30)
Working – self-
employed
33 (9)
Not working – retired or
disabled
195 (51)
Not working – other‡ 43 (11)
Health insurance Yes 344 (89)
Colonoscopy ever Yes 233 (61)
Genetic testing ever Yes 33 (9)
Blood relative with
colon cancer
Yes 53 (14)
Personal history of
cancer ever
Yes 55 (14)
⁎ N=384 for colonoscopy, genetic testing, and cancer; N=382 for
relative with colon cancer. Percent may not total to 100 due to
rounding.
† Range of age.
‡ Includes “not working, but looking for work,” and “not working,
other”.Results
Respondents
Of the 650 members of the Knowledge Networks panel who were
asked to participate in the survey, 477 responded (participation
rate 73%) and 451 completed the survey (completion rate 95%).
We excluded 6 respondents with incomplete responses to the
payment card. Another 60 respondents who provided the same
response (test A or test B) for all nine choices in the DCE also were
excluded; however, we included any respondent who chose “no
test” in all the choice questions. The lack of variation in
responses was interpreted as not paying attention to alternatives
shown in the choice questions. The sample for all analyses
therefore included 385 respondents. Table 2 presents selected
characteristics of the respondents.
Preferences for Genetic Testing
Table 3 presents choice-model parameter estimates from an error-
components, random-parameters logit speciﬁcation. Except for the
no-test alternative speciﬁc constant (β0) and most demographic
interactions, all the choice model parameters are statistically
signiﬁcantly different from the mean effect (P o 0.02). Parameters
generally have the expected signs. For example, an increase in the
probability of developing CRC because of the mutation, with a
subsequent increase in expenditures for risk-reducing interven-
tions, such as colonoscopies, contributes positively to individual
utility (β2 4 0). In addition, an increase in the probability of not
developing CRC increases the reference utility for an individual who
takes a genetic test and obtains a negative test result (β3 4 0). The
overall impact on utility for a change in the probability of develop-
ing CRC thus will depend on any given individual’s initial risk,
income, and expected expenditures on colonoscopies. As evidenced
by the standard deviations and error components, there also is
signiﬁcant taste variation regarding information sharing, sensitivity
to cost, inclination to choose a test in certain subpopulations, and
the test result itself (P o 0.05). Table 3 also provides several results
concerning genetic tests and characteristics of individuals who
value test results more highly. The lack of signiﬁcance for the no-
test alternative-speciﬁc constant (β0), its random parameter, and the
error component for no genetic test (P 4 0.05) but signiﬁcant
estimates for certain demographic groups (P o 0.05) suggest that
strong preferences for genetic testing are conﬁned to particular
segments of the general population. Speciﬁcally, employed and less
afﬂuent households preferred genetic tests.
Values of Genetic Test Information
Values of genetic test information were computed as the
marginal willingness to pay for the realized utility of the test
result minus the utility of remaining ignorant. Equation 10
demonstrates the calculation for two alternatives [44], condi-
tional on purchasing the test:Conditional Value¼
β2pL YQ'ð Þþð1pLÞ β3
 
1pf
 
β0
βp
ð10Þ
Table 4 presents the conditional values of accurate and
inaccurate test information for the baseline individual in the
sample with an assumed income of $50,000 and expected
lifetime expenditures that rise in proportion to the probability
of developing CRC. Conditional values are shown for 12.5%,
25.0%, and 50.0% probabilities of developing CRC because of the
Table 3 – Empirical choice model estimates.
Parameter Coefﬁcient Standard Error Z P Value
Choice Model Parameters
Opt-out parameters ðEUNoTestÞ
No test alternative-speciﬁc constant (β0) 2.8259 2.2553 1.2530 0.2102
Age (β1) 0.0387 0.0292 1.3230 0.1858
Never married (β1) 0.5124 1.1524 0.4450 0.6566
Employed (β1) 1.3225 0.5489 2.4090 0.0160
Income (β1) (1000s) 0.0218 0.0079 2.7570 0.0058
Male (β1) 0.7436 0.5042 1.4750 0.1403
White (β1) 0.5855 0.6019 0.9730 0.3307
Household size (β1) 0.4101 0.3028 1.3540 0.1756
Number of children (β1) 0.3140 0.6786 0.4630 0.6436
Test result parameters (U+Status and UStatus)
Utility of risk-reducing expenditure (1000s) (β2) 0.0911 0.0229 3.9810 0.0001
Relative utility of negative result (β3) 3.9280 1.0816 3.6320 0.0003
Genetic test features (UFeatures)
Genetics professional sees test result* (β) 0.6895 0.0789 8.7420 o0.0001
Primary doctor sees test result* (β) 0.6816 0.0883 7.7160 o0.0001
Life and health insurance companies see test result† (β) 1.3711 0.1184 11.5777 o0.0001
Price of genetic test (βp) 0.0023 0.0002 13.1500 o0.0001
Standard Deviations of Choice-Model Parameters
Opt-out parameters (EUNoTest)
No test alternative-speciﬁc constant (β0) 0.3624 0.5354 0.6770 0.4985
Age (β1) 0.0042 0.0097 0.4280 0.6686
Never married (β1) 2.6302 1.4411 1.8250 0.0680
Employed (β1) 0.0045 0.8557 0.0050 0.9958
Income (1000s) (β1) 0.0074 0.0107 0.6930 0.4883
Male (β1) 0.9133 0.7828 1.1670 0.2433
White (β1) 0.2895 1.1501 0.2520 0.8012
Household size (β1) 0.4901 0.1799 2.7250 0.0064
Number of children (β1) 0.4495 1.0360 0.4340 0.6644
Test result parameters (U+Status and UStatus)
Utility of risk-reducing expenditure (1000s) (β2) 0.0874 0.0150 5.8130 o0.0001
Relative utility of negative result (β3) 3.9217 0.5369 7.3050 o0.0001
Genetic test features (UFeatures)
Genetics professional sees test result* (β) 0.7594 0.0905 8.3960 o0.0001
Primary doctor sees test result* (β) 1.0908 0.0948 11.5090 o0.0001
Price of genetic test (βp) 0.0023 0.0002 12.0770 o0.0001
Error Components
No-test alternative 0.0169 0.4326 0.0390 0.9688
Test alternatives 0.5248 0.4239 1.2380 0.2157
Note. Log-likelihood: -2190.453; McFadden’s pseudo R2: 0.374.
EUNoTest, expected utility of test result; U+Status and U-Status, utility of test result-; UFeatures, utility of features.
⁎ Categorical, effects-coded variable.
† Omitted category; computed as the negative sum of included levels. Standard errors, Z statistics, and P values are simulated.
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a parent, grandparent, or great-grandparent with the mutation.
Assuming that greater expenditures on risk-reducing interven-
tions accompany greater risks of developing CRC, the
conditional value of accurate test information was approxi-
mately $1800. Depending on the nature of the changes in
expenditures, values may increase or decrease with the
probability of developing CRC. The incidence of 8.7% for
false negatives was obtained from Hampel et al. [45,46] and
resulted in an expected loss of approximately $150 from test
errors.
Although conditional values measure the beneﬁts individu-
als receive from selecting a test over the no-test option, the
values do not capture the unconditional beneﬁt of adding the
option of genetic testing to individuals’ choice set (compensat-
ing-equivalent measure of consumer surplus). Equation 11presents the calculation for the unconditional value of genetic
tests [44]:
Unconditional Value
¼
lnðexpð½β2pLðYQ'Þþð1pLÞβ3ð1pf ÞÞþexpðβ0ÞÞ lnðexpðβ0ÞÞ
βp
ð11Þ
Table 5 presents the unconditional values of accurate and
inaccurate test information under the same assumptions. The
unconditional values are approximately $200 higher than their
conditional counterparts. Thus, individuals may beneﬁt even
more from introducing a genetic test as a new option.
From a societal perspective, an individual may or may not
purchase a test and consequently may or may not experience
its beneﬁts. Thus, the relevant mean societal value is the
expected beneﬁt minus the expected value of the money
Table 4 – Mean conditional values for genetic-test information.*
Chance of Developing CRC (PL) (%) Assumed Expenditure ($) Accurate Test
† ($) Inaccurate Test (Pf = 0.087)
† (%)
12.5% $5,000 $1,921 (1066,2775) $1,769 (910, 2627)
25.0% $10,000 $1,880 (1028, 2731) $1,732 (872, 2591)
50.0% $20,000 $1,647 (770,2525) $1,519 (627, 2412)
CRC, colorectal cancer.
⁎ Assumes a baseline individual in the sample with an income of $50,000 and expenditures on risk reductions that begin at $5,000 and rise
proportionately with the chance of developing CRC.
† 95% conﬁdence intervals are in parentheses.
V A L U E I N H E A L T H 1 7 ( 2 0 1 4 ) 8 3 8 – 8 4 5 843equivalent of purchasing a test [47]. Equation 12 presents the
calculation:
Expected Benefit
¼
Pðchoosing test over no testÞð½β2pLðYQ'Þþð1pLÞβ3 ð1pf Þβ0Þ
βp
ð12Þ
Table 6 presents the expected beneﬁts of accurate and
inaccurate test information under the same assumptions.
These unconditional values are approximately $50 lower,
because not every individual will choose a genetic test,
but are still insigniﬁcantly different from the conditional
values (P 4 0.05). Sensitivity analyses for these calculations
were performed with wide ranges of income ($0–$250,000) and
expenditures on colonoscopies ($0–$50,000) and revealed no
changes in our conclusions.Discussion
The results indicate that respondents value genetic information
that could help mitigate mortality risks. The valuations are hetero-
geneous across the sample and are greater for employed respond-
ents or poorer households. Speciﬁcally, employed and less afﬂuent
households may prefer genetic tests because genetic information
has value in anticipating income or support in the event of a life-
threatening condition. Males do not value tests signiﬁcantly more
despite the fact that female carriers of the Lynch mutation are also
more prone to developing endometrial cancers [45].
The similarity of the lower bound expected beneﬁts and
conditional values over wide income ranges indicated that
individuals would almost certainly prefer to obtain the informa-
tion. Despite the similarity of the conditional, unconditional, and
expected beneﬁts for this particular application, it is not always
the case that these calculations will yield similar results. For
example, under the same assumptions, if prospective expendi-
tures on mortality risks were a large fraction of income
($45,000), and individuals belonged to a subpopulation that
did not highly value the test, then an almost sure chance of
developing CRC would yield large negative conditional values
(–$1,500) and negligible unconditional values or expectedTable 5 – Mean unconditional values for genetic test info
Chance of developing CRC (PL) (%) Assumed expenditure ($
12.5 5,000
25.0 10,000
50.0 20,000
CRC, colorectal cancer.
* Assumes a baseline individual in the sample with an income of $50,00
proportionately with the chance of developing CRC.
† 95% conﬁdence intervals are given in parentheses.beneﬁts. This potential result would arise because individuals
would have less to gain by purchasing genetic information
because the uncertainty of their status is already low.
Given the costs of current testing technology and the rela-
tively low incidence of Lynch syndrome (2%–4% of all diagnosed
CRCs) [17], our results generally were consistent with other
studies that questioned the overall cost-effectiveness of many
population-based cancer screening programs. Even if tests are
administered to patients at risk of CRC and the cost of tests
decline to $1000, demonstration of cost-effectiveness will require
valuations exceeding those reported herein. Nevertheless, indi-
viduals with a relative having the mutation can beneﬁt privately
and reimbursement authorities can consider the differences in
uptake of particular subgroups when marketing these tests.
This study has several limitations. Our analysis is mainly
applicable to insurance-based health contexts in which genetic
test results lead to well-deﬁned clinical interventions. Second,
the sample was restricted to US respondents aged 50 years and
older so that the nature of colonoscopies would be well under-
stood and testing preferences could be elicited for a more general
population under the premise that a relative had the mutation.
Lynch syndrome can lead to diagnoses of CRC earlier; younger
individuals with relatives who actually have a mutation may
have different preferences. Also, false positives were not included
as an attribute to increase survey comprehension. False positives
for genetic tests for Lynch syndrome, however, have a similar
rate of occurrence as false negatives [45]. Even if their importance
is similar to that of false negatives, we would expect them to
yield losses only on the order of about $100.
In addition to not considering retesting, the empirical model
made assumptions regarding individual behavior: risk neutrality
and a constant marginal utility of income. Although risk aversion is
plausible in medical decision making [48], the assumption of
linearity provided a lower bound on the values of risk-reducing
activities and genetic testing. The presence of risk aversion induces
concavities in utility functions and leads to greater valuations than
would a theory that uses the expected-utility framework. Also, we
used annual income as a proxy for an individual’s value of life.
Income is positively correlated with more natural measures such
as the value of statistical life, which are known to be greater than
income in developed countries [39]. Thus, our results likelyrmation.*
) Accurate test ($)† Inaccurate test (P
f
¼ 0.087) ($)†
2216 (1363–3069) 2065 (1280–2850)
2176 (1382–2969) 2028 (1297–2758)
1943 (1297–2589) 1815 (1221–2410)
0 and expenditures on risk reductions that begin at $5,000 and rise
Table 6 – Expected beneﬁts for genetic test information.*
Chance of developing CRC (PL) (%) Assumed expenditure ($) Accurate test ($)
† Inaccurate test (P
f
¼ 0.087) ($)†
12.5 5,000 1896 (1081–2711) 1737 (993–2482)
25.0 10,000 1854 (1096–2611) 1698 (1006–2390)
50.0 20,000 1609 (1000–2218) 1472 (916–2029)
CRC, colorectal cancer.
* Assumes a baseline individual in the sample with an income of $50,000 and expenditures on risk reductions that begin at $5,000 and rise
proportionately with the chance of developing CRC.
† 95% conﬁdence intervals are given in parentheses.
V A L U E I N H E A L T H 1 7 ( 2 0 1 4 ) 8 3 8 – 8 4 5844underestimate the actual values of genetic test information. The
model can also be generalized to cases in which testing protocols
involve retesting. This would require the embedding of a second-
stage decision, the choice to accept or reject the test result, into
Equations 3 and 4 and eliciting individuals’ preferences for the
credibility of test results and having a retest.Conclusions
This is the ﬁrst study that we know of that uses DCE methods to
elicit individual valuations of genetic test information for elevated
risks for serious but treatable conditions such as Lynch syndrome.
Although our evidence does not yet support the inclusion of
genetic tests in broad cancer screening programs, it does suggest
that targeted individuals or reimbursement authorities in
insurance-based health systems can beneﬁt from reliable genetic
testing services, privacy and ethical concerns notwithstanding.
Source of ﬁnancial support: This study was funded in part
grant from the National Cancer Institute (P01CA130818-1A1) and
with a research fellowship to F. Reed Johnson from RTI Interna-
tional. The authors have no other relevant disclosures.Acknowledgements
The authors would like to thank Sara J. Knight, Deborah A. Marshall,
Uri Ladabaum, Kathryn A. Phillips, and Judith M. E. Walsh for their
support in designing this study, as well as Ryan M. Ziemiecki and
Lauren D. Donnalley for their assistance with the data analyses. Four
anonymous reviewers provided valuable comments and suggestions
during revision. The study was initially supported with a grant from
the National Cancer Institute (P01CA130818-1A1) and with a research
fellowship to F. Reed Johnson from RTI International. The authors
have no conﬂict of interest to declare. Vikram Kilambi bears the
responsibility for the integrity of the data and analyses.Supplemental Materials
Supplemental material accompanying this article can be found in
the online version as a hyperlink at http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.
jval.2014.07.010 or, if a hard copy of article, at www.valueinhealth
journal.com/issues (select volume, issue, and article).
R E F E R E N C E S[1] Burke W, Atkins D, Gwinn M, et al. Genetic test evaluation: information
needs of clinicians, policy makers, and the public. Am J Epidemiol
2002;156:311–8.[2] Wang C, Gonzalez R, Merajver SD. Assessment of genetic testing and
related counseling services: current research and future directions.
Soc Sci Med 2004;58:1427–42.
[3] Lee DW, Neumann PJ, Rizzo JA. Understanding the medical
and nonmedical value of diagnostic testing. Value Health
2010;13:310–4.
[4] Vasen HF, Möslein G, Alonso A, et al. Guidelines for the clinical
management of Lynch syndrome (hereditary non-polyposis cancer).
J Med Genet 2007;44:353–62.
[5] American Society of Clinical Oncology. American Society of Clinical
Oncology policy statement update: genetic testing for cancer
susceptibility. J Clin Oncol 2003;21:2397–406.
[6] Engstrom P. Update: NCCN colon cancer clinical practice guidelines.
J Natl Compr Canc Netw 2005;3(Suppl. 1):S25–8.
[7] Julié C, Trésallet C, Brouquet A, et al. Identiﬁcation in daily
practice of patients with Lynch syndrome (hereditary nonpolyposis
colorectal cancer): revised Bethesda guidelines-based approach
versus molecular screening. Am J Gastroenterol 2008;103:2825–35:
(quiz 2836).
[8] Landsbergen KM, Prins JB, Brunner HG, Hoogerbrugge N. Genetic testing
offered directly after the diagnosis of colorectal cancer: a pilot study on
the reactions of patients. Genet Couns 2009;20:317–25.
[9] Levin B, Barthel JS, Burt RW, et al. Colorectal cancer screening clinical
practice guidelines. J Natl Compr Canc Netw 2006;4:384–420.
[10] Rogowski W. Genetic screening by DNA technology: a systematic
review of health economic evidence. Int J Technol Assess Health Care
2006;22:327–37.
[11] Rogowski WH, Grosse SD, Khoury MJ. Challenges of translating genetic
tests into clinical and public health practice. Nat Rev Genet
2009;10:489–95.
[12] Grosse SD, Wordsworth S, Payne K. Economic methods for valuing the
outcomes of genetic testing: beyond cost-effectiveness analysis. Genet
Med 2008;10:648–54.
[13] Payne K, Nicholls S, McAllister M, et al. Outcome measurement in
clinical genetics services: a systematic review of validated measures.
Value Health 2008;11:497–508.
[14] Foster MW, Mulvihill JJ, Sharp RR. Evaluating the utility of personal
genomic information. Genet Med 2009;11:570–4.
[15] Grosse SD, Rogowski WH, Ross LF, et al. Population screening for
genetic disorders in the 21st century: evidence, economics, and ethics.
Public Health Genomics 2010;13:106–15.
[16] Neumann PJ, Cohen JT, Hammitt JK, et al. Willingness-to-pay for
predictive tests with no immediate treatment implications: a survey of
US residents. Health Econ 2012;21:238–51.
[17] Dinh TA, Rosner BI, Atwood JC, et al. Health beneﬁts and cost-
effectiveness of primary genetic screening for Lynch syndrome in the
general population. Cancer Prev Res (Phila) 2011;4:9–22.
[18] Grosse SD, McBride CM, Evans JP, Khoury MJ. Personal utility and
genomic information: look before you leap. Genet Med 2009;11:
575–6.
[19] Bridges JF. Stated preference methods in health care evaluation: an
emerging methodological paradigm in health economics. Appl Health
Econ Health Policy 2003;2:213–24.
[20] Marshall DA, Johnson FR, Phillips KA, et al. Measuring patient
preferences for colorectal cancer screening using a choice-format
survey. Value Health 2007;10:415–30.
[21] Vasen HF, Wijnen JT, Menko FH, et al. Cancer risk in families with
hereditary nonpolyposis colorectal cancer diagnosed by mutation
analysis. Gastroenterology 1996;110:1020–7.
[22] Walsh J, Arora M, Hosenfeld C, et al. Preferences for genetic testing
to identify hereditary colorectal cancer: perspectives of high-risk
patients, community members, and clinicians. J Cancer Educ
2012;27:112–9.
[23] Johnson FR, Mohamed AF, Ozdemir S, et al. How does cost matter
in health-care discrete-choice experiments? Health Econ
2011;20:323–30.
V A L U E I N H E A L T H 1 7 ( 2 0 1 4 ) 8 3 8 – 8 4 5 845[24] Bridges JF, Hauber AB, Marshall D, et al. Conjoint analysis applications
in health–a checklist: a report of the ISPOR Good Research Practices for
Conjoint Analysis Task Force. Value Health 2011;14:403–13.
[25] Hauber AB, Mohamed AF, Watson ME, et al. Beneﬁts, risk, and
uncertainty: preferences of antiretroviral-naïve African Americans for
HIV treatments. AIDS Patient Care STDS 2009;23:29–34.
[26] Keogh LA, van Vliet CM, Studdert DM, et al. Is uptake of genetic testing
for colorectal cancer inﬂuenced by knowledge of insurance
implications? Med J Aust 2009;191:255–8.
[27] Rose A, Peters N, Shea JA, Armstrong K, et al., The association between
knowledge and attitudes about genetic testing for cancer risk in the
United States. J Health Commun 2005;10:309–21.
[28] Ulrich CM, Kristal AR, White E, et al. Genetic testing for cancer risk:
a population survey on attitudes and intention. Community Genet
1998;1:213–22.
[29] Dey A. Orthogonal Fractional Factorial Designs. New York: Halstead
Press, 1985.
[30] Huber J, Zwerina KB. The importance of utility balance in efﬁcient
choice designs. J Mark Res 1996;33:307–17.
[31] Kanninen B. Optimal design for multinomial choice experiments.
J Mark Res 2002;39:214–27.
[32] Kuhfeld WF. Experimental Design: Efﬁciency, Coding, and Choice
Designs. Cary, NC: SAS Institute, Inc, 2010.
[33] Kuhfeld WF. Marketing Research Methods in SAS. Cary, NC: SAS
Institute, Inc, 2010.
[34] Reed Johnson F, Lancsar E, Marshall D, et al. Constructing experimental
designs for discrete-choice experiments: report of the ISPOR Conjoint
Analysis Experimental Design Good Research Practices Task Force.
Value Health 2013;16:3–13.
[35] Chang L, Krosnick JA. National surveys via RDD telephone interviewing
versus the Internet. Public Opin Q 2009;73:641–78.
[36] Heeren T, Edwards EM, Dennis JM, et al. A comparison of results from
an alcohol survey of a prerecruited Internet panel and the National
Epidemiologic Survey on Alcohol and Related Conditions. Alcohol Clin
Exp Res 2008;32:222–9.[37] Yeager DS, Krosnick JA, Chang LC, et al. Comparing the accuracy of
RDD telephone surveys and internet surveys conducted with
probability and non-probability samples. Public Opin Q
2011;75:709–47.
[38] Van Houtven G, Johnson FR, Kilambi V, Hauber AB. Eliciting beneﬁt-risk
preferences and probability-weighted utility using choice-format
conjoint analysis. Med Decis Making 2011;31:469–80.
[39] Hammitt JK, Robinson LA. The income elasticity of the value per
statistical life: transferring estimates between high and low income
populations. J Beneﬁt-Cost Analysis 2011;2:1–27.
[40] Train K. Discrete Choice Methods with Simulation. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2003.
[41] Train K, Sonnier G. Mixed logit with bounded distributions of correlated
partworths. In: Alberini SR, ed. Applications of Simulation Methods in
Environmental and Resource Economics. Dordrecht, Netherlands:
Springer Netherlands, 2005. pp. 117–34.
[42] Hensher DA, Rose JM, Greene WH. Combining RP and SP data: biases in
using the nested logit ‘trick’ – contrasts with ﬂexible mixed logit
incorporating panel and scale effects. J Transp Geogr 2008;16:126–33.
[43] NLOGIT. Plainview, NY: Econometric Software, Inc., 2000.
[44] Lancsar E, Savage E. Deriving welfare measures from discrete choice
experiments: inconsistency between current methods and random
utility and welfare theory. Health Econ 2004;13:901–7.
[45] Hampel H, Frankel WL, Martin E, et al. Screening for the Lynch
syndrome (hereditary nonpolyposis colorectal cancer). N Engl J Med
2005;352:1851–60.
[46] Teutsch SM, Bradley LA, Palomaki GE, et al. EGAPP Working Group. The
Evaluation of Genomic Applications in Practice and Prevention (EGAPP)
Initiative: methods of the EGAPP Working Group. Genet Med
2009;11:3–14.
[47] Freeman AM. The Measurement of Environmental and Resource
Values: Theory and Methods. Washington, DC: Resources for the
Future, 2003.
[48] Bleichrodt H, Pinto JL. The validity of QALYs under non-expected
utility*. Econ J 2005;115:533–50.
